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Student Conduct Regulations
Arthur J. Marinelli, Jr.*
f HE LAW RELATING TO UNIVERSITY STUDENTS in their relationships
with their schools has been undergoing rapid change as stu-
dents have sought judicial relief when subjected to disciplinary action
by universities. The courts have, in recent years, applied constitu-
tional standards in reviewing the action of university officials with
respect to the form of student conduct regulations, student expres-
sion, and disciplinary proceedings in the tax-supported university.
Judicial abstention was once the rule, historically based upon a
number of varying theories. Attendance at a university was once re-
garded as a "privilege," 1 and regulation of student action has been
upheld on this theory as well as those of "in loco parentis"2 and
"contract. ' 3 An administrator's actions can no longer be defended on
the basis that he stands in the place of a parent, or that school at-
tendance is a mere "privilege" which can be revoked at will.
Procedural Due Process
The earlier theories, which did not provide any constitutional
guarantee of notice or hearing to the university student in an ex-
pulsion case, were repudiated in the fountainhead case of Dixon 'v.
Alabama State Bd. of Edue.4 The procedural due process require-
ments for students in a tax-supported college, which the Dixon
court laid down, include the following: (1) a notice of the statement
of charges must be given to the student; (2) a right to a hearing
must be provided; (3) the student must be given the right to present
testimony to the hearing body; (4) the right to inspect the record and
the findings of the hearing body must be provided the student.
Dixon did not answer all the questions concerning the hearing
process. Subsequent judicial decisions, some of them conflicting, have
laid down rules which provide, variously, that the student is entitled
to have counsel at the hearing,5 that the right to counsel may depend
'Associate Professor of Business Law, Ohio University; mesnber of the Ohio Bar.
'Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Bd. of Trustees v.
Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 62 So. 827 (1913), af'd. 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
2 Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 413, 102 So. 637 (1924); Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky.
376, 161 S. W. 204 (1913).
3 This concept was generally limited to private schools. See e. g., University of Miami v.
Militana, 184 So. 23 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical
College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N. W. 589 (1909); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div.
487, 231 N. Y. S. 435 (1928).
4 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F. 2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). Professor Charles Alan
Wright, of the University of Texas, has written of the opinion in Dixon: "The opinion by
Judge Rivers had the force of an idea whose time had come and it has swept the field."
Wright, The Constiution on the Campus, 22 VAND,. L. Rav. 1027, 1032 (1969).
5 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W. D. Mo. 1968), a'd, 415 F.
2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969); Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 899 (Sop.
Ct, 1967).
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on whether the administration has counsel at the hearing,6 and that
the student is not entitled to counsel.7
Because the number of student disciplinary actions in tax-sup-
ported educational institutions has been increasing, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri has entered a
General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in
Review of Student Discipline. This order provides for three minimal
procedural requirements, growing out of conceptions of fundamental
fairness, in cases of severe discipline.8
First, the student should be given adequate notice in
writing of the specific ground or grounds and the nature of
the evidence on which the disciplinary proceedings are based.
Second, the student should be given an opportunity for a
hearing in which the disciplinary authority provides a fair
opportunity for hearing of the student's position, explana-
tions and evidence. The third requirement is that no discipli-
nary action be taken on grounds which are not supported by
any substantial evidence.9
The procedural due process requirements of Dixon were incor-
porated into a Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students0
6Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F. 2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); French v. Bashful, 303 F.
Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969).
Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 237 (S. D. W. Va.), affd, 399 F. 2d 638 (4th Cit.
1968, cen. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396,
403 (M.D. Fla. 1963).
1 45 F.R.D. 133, 147 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
9 Id.
10 54 AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS BULL. 261 (1968). The following were the
recommended hearing procedures:
When the misconduct may result in serious penalties and if the student ques-
tions the fairness of disciplinary action taken against him, he should be granted,
on request, the privilege of a hearing before a regularly constituted hearing com-
mittee. The following suggested hearing committee procedures satisfy the require-
ments of procedural due process in situations requiring a high degree of formality.
1. The hearing committee should include faculty members or students, or,
if regularly included or requested by the accused, both faculty and student mem-
bers. No member of the hearing committee who is otherwise interested in the
particular case should sit in judgment during the proceeding.
2. The student should be informed, in writing, of the reasons for the pro-
posed disciplinary action with sufficient particularly (sic), and in sufficient time,
to insure opportunity to prepare for the hearing.
3. The student appearing before the hearing committee should have the
right to be assisted in his defense by an advisor of his choice.
4. The burden of proof should rest upon the officials bringing the charge.
5. The student should be given an opportunity to testify and to present evi-
dence and witnesses. He should have an opportunity to hear and question adverse
witnesses. Ia no case should the committcce consider statements against him unless
he has been advised of their content and of the names of those who made them,
and unless he has been given an opportunity to rebut unfavorable inferences
which might otherwise be drawn.
(Continued on next page)
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by a committee of representatives of the American Association of
University Professors, the Association of American Colleges, the
U. S. National Student Association, and the National Association of
Student Personnel Administrators. This statement represents policy
and procedure above the minimum requirements of federal law,
which will help ensure the confidence necessary to the operation of
a student discipline system.1
The following ominous and now-classic statement made in 1957
by Professor Warren Seavey is, fortunately, no longer true:
Our sense of justice should be outraged by denial to
students of the normal safeguards. It is shocking that the
officials of a state educational institution, which can func-
tion properly only if our freedoms are preserved, should not
understand the elementary principles of fair play. It is
equally shocking to find that a court supports them in deny-
ing to a student the protection given to a pickpocket.
12
Dixon has now provided the "rudiments of an adversary pro-
ceeding" 3 and has provided many procedures similar to those in a
criminal trial. When a tax-supported university, which is considered
a state governmental body, suspends or expels a student, the suspen-
sion or expulsion is such an injury that the "Constitution requires
the act to be consonant with due process of law."' 4
One of the most significant cases since Dixon is Jones v. State
Rd. of Edur.'5 The Sixth Circut court in Jones held that the stu-
dents were not deprived of their due process rights where the pro-
cedures provided the students were fair and reasonable. The court
found that only the most informal administrative procedures are
necessary where the potential sanctions for misconduct do not in-
clude expulsion or suspension1" and that the hearing must provide
the rudiments of an adversary proceeding. 7
(Continued from preceding page)
6. All matters upon which the decision may be based must be introduced
into evidence at the proceeding before the hearing committee. The decision should
be based solely upon such matters. Improperly acquired evidence should not be
admitted.
7. In the absence of a transcript, there should be both a digest and a
verbatim record, such as a tape recording, of the hearing.
8. The decision of the hearing committee should be final, subject only to
the student's right of appeal to the president or ultimately to the governing board
of the institution.
lid.
12 Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406 (1959).
"Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F. 2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961).
" Id. at 155.
Is Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), afl'd, 407 F. 2d
834 (6th Cit. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 31 (1970).
" Id. at 198.
15 Id.
1970] 127
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A substantial number of articles and commentators have enu-
merated and explained the procedural due process rights that are
required or recommended in disciplinary hearings.18 Now that many
of the procedural guarantees necessary for due process are being
implemented by universities, other problems relating to the substance
of the rules and regulations prescribing specific conduct, which rules
give rise to the disciplinary hearings in the first place, must be
examined in light of the constitutional doctrines of vagueness and
overbreadth.
Substantive Limitations
While "the history of liberty has largely been the history of ob-
servance of procedural safeguards,"1 as noted by the late Justice
Frankfurter, substantive due process is of at least equal importance.
There is little doubt that the imposition of penalties has a significant
impact on a student's reputation and career. The university's rules of
conduct constitute the criminal law of the campus.20 With the recent
increase in student activism, attacks on the constitutionality of
campus regulations as they affect the rights of expression and asso-
ciation have raised the issue of whether regulations need to be definite
and reasonably narrow.2 1
Typically overly-broad university regulations are usually included
in a handbook or catalogue given to the new student. An example of
this kind of rule is the following:
It is taken for granted that each student ...will ad-
here to acceptable standards of personal conduct; and that
all students . . .will set and observe among themselves
proper standards of conduct and good taste ...This pre-
sumption in favor of the students ...continues until, by
misconduct, it is reversed, in which case the University
authorities will take such action as the particular occur-
rence judged in the light of the attendant circumstances,
may seem to require ...1
18 Heyman, Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 73
(1966); Johnson, The Contitutional Rights of College Students, 42 TEX. L. REV, 344
(1964); Monypenney, University Purpose, Discipline, and Due Process, 43 N.D.L. REV.
739 (1967); Pettigrew and Howard, Due Process and Student Discipline in Ohio Higher
Education, 44 Ono BAR 129 (1971); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State
University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. t. REV. 368 (1963); Van Alstyne, The Student as a Uni.
varsity Resident, 45 DENVER L. J. 582 (1968).
19 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 322, 347 (1943).
Comment, Private Government on the Campus - Judicial Review of University Expulsions,
72 YALE L. J. 1362, 1364 (1963).
21 Narrow and definite conduct regulations are listed by Professor Van Alstyne as require-
ments among the "essential elements of fair procedure." Van Alstyne, The judicial Trend
Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. Riv 290, 295 (1968).
22 GENERAL CATALOG OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, as set forth in
Goldberg v. Regents of University of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 870, 57 Cal. Rptr.
463,466 n. 2 (1967).
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The twin ideas of vagueness and overbreadth are possible deficiencies
which immediately enter the lawyer's mind when he reads this rule."
These bases of constitutional infirmity must be individually examined
as each is applied to university regulations.
The due process clause protects against the enforcement of any
statute which "either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application . . .- 24 Terms must pro-
vide "an ascertainable standard of conduct" 5 and be "susceptible of
objective measurement.""
The principle against vague regulations is based on concepts of
fair play," and a part of this concept is the need for notice. A regula-
tion must contain ascertainable standards of conduct 9 and warn that
certain conduct will result in certain sanctions. 9
Vagueness questions require a delicate due process balancing
which considers the severity "0 and the means of execution of the
sanction3' as variables to the permissible vagueness. Those matters
considered malum in se (inherently wrong) require less definiteness
than those considered malum prohibitum (wrong because the statute
says it is wrong). 32
Legislation or regulations must not infringe upon protected lib-
erties by being broadly drawn. 33 Laws must be narrowly drawn to
protect only against prohibitable conduct, not with "means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved."' 4 Overbreadth refers to the inhibition of
the first amendment freedoms of speech, peaceable assembly, press,
and religion.'5 Where institutional regulations have limited individual
3 See generally, Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty- An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L. Q.
195 (1955); Scott, Constitutional Limitations on Substantive Criminal Law, 29 ROCKY
MT. L. REV. 275, 287 (1957); Note, Uncertainty in College Disciplinary Regulations, 29
OHIO ST. L. J. 1023 (1968).
2 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
25 Baggert v. BulUitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
26 Cramp v. Bd. of Public Instruction of Orange County, 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961).
27 Note, Uncertainty in College Dicciplinary Regulations, 29 OHIO ST. L. J. 1023, 1026
(1968).
8 Cramp v. Bd. of Public Instruction of Orange County, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
" Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
"0 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
31 See Comment, Legislation - Requirement of Definitoness in Statutory Standards, 53 MICH.
L. REV. 264, 270-75 (1954).
"SUnited States V. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942); See Note, Uncertainty in Collage Discipli-
nary Regulations, 29 OHIO STATE L. J. 1023, 1028 (1968).
3 Dombrowtki v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965): Thorohill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966).
's See Stickgold, Variations on the Theme of Dombrowshi v. Pister - •., 1968 Wis. L. REV.
369 (1968).
1973]
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freedoms, they have undergone close scrutiny because of our guaran-
teed first amendment rights."
In the academic environment, first amendment rights were rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court in 1923, when it held that the due
process clause prevents states from prohibiting the teaching of foreign
languages to students.' Students first sought judicial relief when
subjected to adverse regulations in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette.38 Here in 1943 the Court held that, under the first amend-
ment, students in public schools could not be compelled to salute [he
flag nor be suspended for failure to do so. The Supreme Court held
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District that
first amendment rights do apply to minor students, but are limited
"in light of the special characteristics of the school environment."' 9
In Tinker the school officials punished students for purely "silent,
passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or dis-
turbance . . "40 Where school discipline is being substantially dis-
rupted, school officials may reasonably regulate in order to carry out
the purposes of the educational institution. 41 The fear of a disturbance
was not enough to make the regulations in Tinker reasonable.
Tinker was concerned with the symbolic expression of the anti-
Vietnam War position as a part of the freedom of expression. The
Court in Tinker distinguished between expression and action, which
distinction has been increasingly recognized by the Supreme Court.4'
Professor Thomas I. Emerson has analyzed those values the first
amendment seeks to protect, and has developed the following test:
The essence of a system of freedom of expression lies in
the distinction between expression and action. The whole
theory rests upon the general proposition that expression
must be free and unrestrained, that the state may not seek
to achieve other social objectives through control of expres-
sion, and that the attainment of such objectives can and must
be secured through regulation of action.
43
36 See e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). A
high school board regulation which prohibited the wearing of black armbands worn to
protest the Vietnam War was held to violate the first amendment in absence of evidence
that it was necessary to avoid substantial interference with school discipline or the rights of
others.
37 Barrels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
S West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
39 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
40 Id. at 508.
41 Id. at 513. The Court relied on Blackwell v. Issaguena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F. 2d 749
(5th Cir 1966), where evidence showed the wearing of "freedom buttons' in the school
caused disturbance where buttons were pinned on other students, thus interfering with the
rights of others. This was contrasted with Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744 (5th Cir.
1966), where students were held to have a right to wear "freedom buttons" in school as
long as it did not cause disorder or interfere with the rights of others.
42 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
"3 T. EMERSON, TowARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 115 (1966).
[Vol. 22 :125
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This test is not always an easy one to apply, since "all speech is
necessarily speech plus. If it is oral, it is noise and may interrupt
someone else; if it is written, it may be litter."44
Charles Alan Wright has qualified the application of the first
amendment to the campus as follows: "I do not read the first amend-
ment as granting rights in a vacuum, but rather as granting rights
that exist at a particular time and place."'" It is clear that expression
must be subject to nondiscriminatory and reasonable regulations as
to place and time. Where that expression takes the form of action, it
may be prohibited where it invades the rights of others.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions provides the student
with an area of freedom which may not be invaded by the university.
The university may not condition attendance on a student's accept-
ance of the school's ability to limit his or her constitutionally pro-
tected rights, because benefits and privileges provided by government
may not be conditioned except where justified by an overriding pub-
lic interest.4' Thus, where students are prohibited by university reg-
ulations from attending an orderly off-campus political rally, the
doctrine would be violated because it would require the relinquish-
ment of first amendment protections of association and speech in
order to attend the university.47 In Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ.,48 the court ordered the reinstatment of a college student be-
cause the state could not condition attendance at a state-supported
institution upon a student's forfeiture of his freedom of speech. In
Dickey a student editor had been suspended for attempting to publish
an editorial offensive to the faculty advisor, and for insubordination.
The only rule violated was one that prohibited editorial criticism of
officers of the state.
A university ban on all "parades, celebrations and demonstra-
tions" without prior approval of the college's administrative officials
is clearly unconstitutional and unreasonable.49 Where advance permis-
sion for a demonstration is required, and no standards for granting
or denying permission are provided in the regulation, the require-
ment itself has been held to be invalid. 0 Advance approval can be
required 51 where there are "narrow, objective, and definite standards
"Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, SUP. CT. REv. 1, 23 (1965).
45 Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L_ REV. 1027, 1042 (1969). See also,
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), which states (at 554): "The rights of free speech
and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean that everyone
with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time."
* Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 US. 589 (1967); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F.
Supp. 94 7 (D.S.C. 1967).
" Edward v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
8 Dickey v- Alabama State 8d. of Educ., 273 F. Supp, 513 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
4 Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
50 1d.
" Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80 NARtV. 1. REV. 1773, 1784-85 (1967).
19731
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to guide the licensing authority." 2 Advance notice of demonstrations
can be required, but the notice rule ought to be flexible enough to
permit certain types of spontaneous demonstrations.2 Demonstrations
can be subject to reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulations of
place and time, but for a regulation to be reasonable, consideration
must be given to "all of the nuances of the time, place and manner."
The courts have followed the advice of Justice Fortas in deny-
ing constitutional protection for violent demonstrations. 5 Justice
Fortas has said: ". . . the toleration of violence involves, I think,
even greater risks, not only of present damage and injury but of
erosion of the base of an ordered society."56
While a demonstration can be the subject of nondiscriminatory
and reasonable regulations of time, place, and manner, does the Con-
stitution require that university rules be specific, rather than be ad-
ministered on the basis of vague and imprecise rules? This writer
would agree with Professor Charles Alan Wright that:
It will do a student very little good to be given every
protection of procedural due process ever thought of any-
where if, in the end, he may be expelled because the tribunal
is free to apply a subjective judgment about what is accept-
able conduct. This would be neither fair nor reasonable. 57
The restriction of speech and association requires judicial scru-
tiny of often previously-unchallenged systems of college regulations.
Professor Wright has stated that "the single most important principle
in applying the Constitution on the campus should be that discipline
cannot be administered on the basis of vague and imprecise rules."8
The courts will not require more of university rules than of
criminal statutes in the area of vagueness, and they should not re-
quire less. The Supreme Court has praised as "narrowly drawn" a
statute which barred picketing "near" a court house,5' and has sus-
tained a criminal statute which prohibited "picketing in such a
manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress to
or from any county courthouse. '60
'I Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969).
13 Powe v. Miles, 407 F. 2d 73, 84 (2d Cit. 1968).
s1 Davis v. Francois, 395 F. 2d 730, 736 (5th Cit. 1968).
55 See Evers v. Birdsong, 287 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Miss., 1968).
56 A. FOETAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 93 (1968).
Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1064 (1969).
s' Id. at 1065.
s' Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965).
"Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616 (1968).
[Vol. 22 :125
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol22/iss1/10
STUDENT CONDUCT REGULATIONS
The void-for-vagueness principle has been considered by the
courts in a number of cases relating to campus law, One of them,
Soglin v. Kau/jfman,6 involved an attack on university regulations
based on both vagueness and overbreadth. The regulation in question
provided that students might, through "lawful means," support
causes which did not disrupt the operations of the university. The
university instituted disciplinary hearings for a violation of this
regulation and for "misconduct" when students obstructed doorways,
halls, and entrances in order to block student interviews with Dow
Chemical Company's placement representatives. The court held that
the standards of vagueness and overbreadth apply to university reg-
ulations, and followed the guidelines of the American Association of
University Professors that student codes should be phrased in definite
terms, published, and made available to students. 2 The regulation
was ambiguous since it could be read to prohibit even lawful means
to support causes which disrupted, or unlawful means which dis-
rupted operations, and no requirement of substantiality, proximity
or intention was necessary. The court left open whether the doctrines
of vagueness and ovcrbreadth would apply to "proceedings in which
the range of possible sanctions is mild, such as the denial of social
privileges or a minor loss of academic credits or perhaps expulsion
from a specific course, or perhaps a brief suspension."63 The students
in Soglin were not in fact exercising constitutionally protected rights,
but the court applied a doctrine of constitutional law that one may
challenge an overly broad prohibition even though the challengers'
conduct would not be protected.64 The Seventh Circuit in affirming
the case relied on Dombrowski v. Pfister 6 by holding that the regula-
tions in Soglin were overbroad and swept into the arena of first
amendment freedoms. Moreover, the court sustained the trial court
on the standing issue by ruling that plaintiffs could challenge the
regulation.
The university argued that it had the inherent power to discipline
students without the need for a rule. This judicial attitude that a uni-
versity has inherent power to discipline a student without regard to
the existence of an explicit rule is reflected in the old holding of
Koblitz v. Western Reserve University" and in the rationale of Gold-
" Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), afl'd, 418 F. 2d. 163 (7th Cir.
1969).
62 51 AAUP BULL. 447, 449 (1965).
63 Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 991 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff'd, 418 F. 2d 163 (7th
Cir. 1969),
64NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-8,
(1940); see Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1066-67
(1969), where the use of vagueness in Soglin's holding is applauded, but disagreement
with the use of the overbreadth doctrine to defend "hard-core misconduct" is expressed.
Is Dombrowski v. Pfiser, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
6 Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., II Ohio C. Dec. 515 (Ct. App. 1901).
1973]
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berg v. Regents of University of California." In Goldberg, the stu-
dents involved used vulgar words on signs, at assemblies, and over
loudspeakers. The regulation dismissing the students required stu-
dent adherence to "acceptable standards of personal conduct" and
"good taste." The students argued that the regulations were uncon-
stitutionally vague because of a defect in notice, but this contention
was rejected. The court held that a university has "inherent general
powers to maintain order on the campus and to exclude therefrom
those who are detrimental to its well being."6 The participants in
Berkeley's "Filthy Speech Movement" went beyond those first amend-
ment limits recognized in Redrup v. New York,69 with "an assault
upon individual privacy by publication in a manner so obtrusive as
to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure
to it."'" The Goldberg case provided the rationale for Jones v. State
Bd. of Educ.,7' wherein the court found that a university could
discipline without a rule at all, and hence was not concerned with
vagueness.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sword v. Foxn2 held that
the "same specificity is not required in college rules as is necessary in
criminal statutes, ' 17 3 and that all that is required is language which
"conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice." 74 The Court
found that the word "demonstration" itself is an adequately definite
descriptive term. 5
In Soglin the court took a definite stand against the outcome of
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College" which followed Koblitz,
Goldberg, Jones, and others in the general line of cases that held that
the university has inherent power to discipline, regardless of the
existence or the quality of rules.
Conclusion
As the court remarked in Sword v. Fox, there is a sharp diver-
gence in opinion whether a given set of university regulations is
possibly violative of due process because of vagueness and over-
"Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal, App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rpr. 463 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1967).
Id., 57 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
68 Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
11 Id at 769.
n Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407 r. 2d 834
(6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 31 (1970).
' Sword v. Fox, 446 F. 2d 1091 (4th Cit. 1971).
'3 Id. at 1099, iting aho, Jones v. Snead, 431 F. 2d 1115, 1117 (Sh Cir. 1970).
11 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
75 Sword v. Fox, 446 F. 2d 1091, 1100 (4th Cit. 1971).
76 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968), all'd, 415 F.
2d 1077 (Sh Cit. 1969), cert. de-nied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
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breadth, 7 The arguments against specificity and narrowness are that
educational institutions are seldom equipped with a fulltime legislative
service commission, and that a significant burden will, therefore, be
placed upon the university. General conduct regulations also permit
university administrators to discipline students based upon political
pressure brought to bear upon the state universities because of their
dependence upon the state legislatures and governor for funds. 8
At the University of Oregon, penalties are to be imposed only
upon the violation of pre-existing rules, and the rules must be precise
enough to control discretion and provide notice. 7 9 The use of narrow
and specific rules can operate successfully on the campus. Certainly
there are costs of time and effort in adjudication, but statistics in-
dicate that fewer than 10% of the students charged with misconduct
deny the facts or take exception to the discipline administratively
imposed."
The Constitution has arrived on the university campus, and it is
to be preferred that the universities accept this fact on their own,
rather than have it forced upon them by a court. Today, freedom of
expression and procedural fairness are part of campus law, and "the
courts ...are ready to vindicate claims for justice rooted in con-
stitutional principle." 8'
7 Sword v. Fox, 446 F. 2d 1091, 1099 (4th Cir. 1971).
7t See Note, Uncertainty in College Disciplinary Regulations, 29 OHbo ST, L J. 1023, 1034
(1968).
7 Linde, Campus Law: Berkeley Viewed From Eugene, 54 CALIF. L. Rav. 40, 52 (1966).
8OVan Aistyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
371 (1963).
61 Tigar, Book Review, 67 MicH. L. REV. 612, 613 (1969).
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